Title of article :
Lying through their teeth: Third party advice and truth telling in a strategy proof mechanism
Author/Authors :
Guillen، نويسنده , , Pablo and Hing، نويسنده , , Alexander، نويسنده ,
Issue Information :
ماهنامه با شماره پیاپی سال 2014
Pages :
8
From page :
178
To page :
185
Abstract :
We test the effect of advice on the well-known top trading cycles (TTC) matching algorithm. We compare three treatments involving third party advice [right advice (R), wrong advice (W), and both right and wrong advice (RW)] to a no-advice baseline (B). In line with previous literature the truth telling rate is higher than 70% in B, but it does not even reach 30% in W. Truth telling rates are also significantly lower in the other advice treatments when compared to B. This evidence suggests that the majority of participants in matching experiments fail to understand strategy-proofness, as they can be easily influenced by advice. High truth telling rates may just be the result of participants taking a default option.
Keywords :
Matching , Top trading cycles , Confusion , Economic experiments , strategy-proofness
Journal title :
European Economic Review
Serial Year :
2014
Journal title :
European Economic Review
Record number :
1799274
Link To Document :
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