Title of article
Lying through their teeth: Third party advice and truth telling in a strategy proof mechanism
Author/Authors
Guillen، نويسنده , , Pablo and Hing، نويسنده , , Alexander، نويسنده ,
Issue Information
ماهنامه با شماره پیاپی سال 2014
Pages
8
From page
178
To page
185
Abstract
We test the effect of advice on the well-known top trading cycles (TTC) matching algorithm. We compare three treatments involving third party advice [right advice (R), wrong advice (W), and both right and wrong advice (RW)] to a no-advice baseline (B). In line with previous literature the truth telling rate is higher than 70% in B, but it does not even reach 30% in W. Truth telling rates are also significantly lower in the other advice treatments when compared to B. This evidence suggests that the majority of participants in matching experiments fail to understand strategy-proofness, as they can be easily influenced by advice. High truth telling rates may just be the result of participants taking a default option.
Keywords
Matching , Top trading cycles , Confusion , Economic experiments , strategy-proofness
Journal title
European Economic Review
Serial Year
2014
Journal title
European Economic Review
Record number
1799274
Link To Document