Title of article
Multi-stage sequential all-pay auctions
Author/Authors
Segev، نويسنده , , Ella and Sela، نويسنده , , Aner، نويسنده ,
Issue Information
ماهنامه با شماره پیاپی سال 2014
Pages
12
From page
371
To page
382
Abstract
We study multi-stage sequential all-pay contests (auctions) where heterogeneous contestants are privately informed about a parameter (ability) that affects their cost of effort. We characterize the perfect Bayesian equilibrium of these contests and analyze the effect of the number of contestants and their types on the contestants׳ expected highest effort.
Keywords
Sequential contests , all-pay auctions
Journal title
European Economic Review
Serial Year
2014
Journal title
European Economic Review
Record number
1799308
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