Title of article :
Methodological individualism in experimental games: Not so easily dismissed
Author/Authors :
Krueger، نويسنده , , Joachim I.، نويسنده ,
Issue Information :
ماهنامه با شماره پیاپی سال 2008
Pages :
4
From page :
398
To page :
401
Abstract :
Orthodox game theory and social preference models cannot explain why people cooperate in many experimental games or how they manage to coordinate their choices. The theory of evidential decision making provides a solution, based on the idea that people tend to project their own choices onto others, whatever these choices might be. Evidential decision making preserves methodological individualism, and it works without recourse to social preferences. Rejecting methodological individualism, team reasoning is a thinly disguised resurgence of the group mind fallacy, and the experiments reported by Colman et al. [Colman, A. M., Pulford, B. D., & Rose, J. (this issue). Collective rationality in interactive decisions: Evidence for team reasoning. Acta Psychologica, doi:10.1016/j.actpsy.2007.08.003.] do not offer evidence that uniquely supports team reasoning.
Keywords :
2340 , 3040 , social projection , Methodological Individualism , Team reasoning , 3020 , Game theory
Journal title :
Acta Psychologica
Serial Year :
2008
Journal title :
Acta Psychologica
Record number :
1904017
Link To Document :
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