Managerial legal liability and Big 4 auditor choice

This study investigates the effect of directorsʹ and officersʹ (hereafter D&O) liability insurance coverage on auditor choice. Based on a sample of 671 Taiwanese listed firms with D&O legal liability insurance data, our evidence shows that companies with excess D&O liability insurance coverage are less likely to appoint Big 4 auditors. Furthermore, we find that Big 4 auditors are more likely to issue unclean opinions and to constrain the abnormal accruals and ‘beating or meeting’ earnings benchmarks for their clients with excess D&O liability insurance coverage. The findings document that a higher level of D&O liability insurance coverage increases Big 4 auditorsʹ concerns about the credibility of financial statements. Given this, Big 4 auditors have incentive to require more conservative accounting choices for these clients in order to minimize possible litigation risk and reputation damage.