Failed attempts to help and harm: Intention versus outcome in preverbal infants’ social evaluations

Mature moral judgments include an analysis of both the outcomes of others’ actions as well as the mental states that drive them. While adults easily incorporate both intention and outcome into their moral evaluations, scores of developmental studies suggest that it may be uniquely difficult for young children to privilege intention in their judgments of right and wrong (e.g., Piaget, 1932/1965), leading to the conclusion that the ‘moral mind’ of the young child is fundamentally different from that of older children and adults. The current studies utilize a puppet-choice methodology shown to provoke reliable social preferences throughout the first year after birth (e.g., Hamlin, Wynn, & Bloom, 2007), and provide evidence that 8-month-old infants incorporate, and even privilege, intentions in their social evaluations. In contrast, 5-month-olds appear only able to distinguish characters who intend the outcomes they cause. Such results suggest that one requirement for mature moral judgments, the ability to distinguish between intentions and outcomes in morally relevant events, is present by 8 months of age.