Title of article
Authentic Gettier cases: A reply to Starmans and Friedman
Author/Authors
Nagel، نويسنده , , Jennifer and Mar، نويسنده , , Raymond and San Juan، نويسنده , , Valerie، نويسنده ,
Issue Information
روزنامه با شماره پیاپی سال 2013
Pages
4
From page
666
To page
669
Abstract
Do laypeople and philosophers differ in their attributions of knowledge? Starmans and Friedman maintain that laypeople differ from philosophers in taking ‘authentic evidence’ Gettier cases to be cases of knowledge. Their reply helpfully clarifies the distinction between ‘authentic evidence’ and ‘apparent evidence’. Using their sharpened presentation of this distinction, we contend that the argument of our original paper still stands.
Keywords
Gettier cases , Mental state inference , Lay beliefs , Knowledge ascription
Journal title
Cognition
Serial Year
2013
Journal title
Cognition
Record number
2077915
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