Title of article :
It pays to have friends
Author/Authors :
Hwang، نويسنده , , Byoung-Hyoun and Kim، نويسنده , , Seoyoung، نويسنده ,
Issue Information :
روزنامه با شماره پیاپی سال 2009
Abstract :
Currently, a director is classified as independent if he or she has neither financial nor familial ties to the CEO or to the firm. We add another dimension: social ties. Using a unique data set, we find that 87% of boards are conventionally independent but that only 62% are conventionally and socially independent. Furthermore, firms whose boards are conventionally and socially independent award a significantly lower level of compensation, exhibit stronger pay-performance sensitivity, and exhibit stronger turnover-performance sensitivity than firms whose boards are only conventionally independent. Our results suggest that social ties do matter and that, consequently, a considerable percentage of the conventionally independent boards are substantively not.
Keywords :
executive compensation , Board independence , social ties
Journal title :
Journal of Financial Economics
Journal title :
Journal of Financial Economics