• Title of article

    Employee treatment and firm leverage: A test of the stakeholder theory of capital structure

  • Author/Authors

    Bae، نويسنده , , Kee-Hong and Kang، نويسنده , , Jun-Koo and Wang، نويسنده , , Jin، نويسنده ,

  • Issue Information
    روزنامه با شماره پیاپی سال 2011
  • Pages
    24
  • From page
    130
  • To page
    153
  • Abstract
    We investigate the stakeholder theory of capital structure from the perspective of a firm’s relations with its employees. We find that firms that treat their employees fairly (as measured by high employee‐friendly ratings) maintain low debt ratios. This result is robust to a variety of model specifications and endogeneity issues. The negative relation between leverage and a firm’s ability to treat employees fairly is also evident when we measure its ability by whether it is included in the Fortune magazine list, “100 Best Companies to Work For.” These results suggest that a firm’s incentive or ability to offer fair employee treatment is an important determinant of its financing policy.
  • Keywords
    Capital Structure , Employee treatment , KLD rating , endogeneity , stakeholder
  • Journal title
    Journal of Financial Economics
  • Serial Year
    2011
  • Journal title
    Journal of Financial Economics
  • Record number

    2212008