• Title of article

    Stock option grants to target CEOs during private merger negotiations

  • Author/Authors

    Fich، نويسنده , , Eliezer M. and Cai، نويسنده , , Jie and Tran، نويسنده , , Anh L. and Fonarow، نويسنده ,

  • Issue Information
    روزنامه با شماره پیاپی سال 2011
  • Pages
    18
  • From page
    413
  • To page
    430
  • Abstract
    Unscheduled stock options to target chief executive officers (CEOs) are a nontrivial phenomenon during private merger negotiations. In 920 acquisition bids during 1999–2007, over 13% of targets grant them. These options substitute for golden parachutes and compensate target CEOs for the benefits they forfeit because of the merger. Targets granting unscheduled options are more likely to be acquired but they earn lower premiums. Consequently, deal value drops by $62 for every dollar target CEOs receive from unscheduled options. Conversely, acquirers of targets offering these awards experience higher returns. Therefore, deals involving unscheduled grants exhibit a transfer of wealth from target shareholders to bidder shareholders.
  • Keywords
    Merger negotiations , takeover premium , stock options
  • Journal title
    Journal of Financial Economics
  • Serial Year
    2011
  • Journal title
    Journal of Financial Economics
  • Record number

    2212095