Title of article :
Stock option grants to target CEOs during private merger negotiations
Author/Authors :
Fich، نويسنده , , Eliezer M. and Cai، نويسنده , , Jie and Tran، نويسنده , , Anh L. and Fonarow، نويسنده ,
Issue Information :
روزنامه با شماره پیاپی سال 2011
Pages :
18
From page :
413
To page :
430
Abstract :
Unscheduled stock options to target chief executive officers (CEOs) are a nontrivial phenomenon during private merger negotiations. In 920 acquisition bids during 1999–2007, over 13% of targets grant them. These options substitute for golden parachutes and compensate target CEOs for the benefits they forfeit because of the merger. Targets granting unscheduled options are more likely to be acquired but they earn lower premiums. Consequently, deal value drops by $62 for every dollar target CEOs receive from unscheduled options. Conversely, acquirers of targets offering these awards experience higher returns. Therefore, deals involving unscheduled grants exhibit a transfer of wealth from target shareholders to bidder shareholders.
Keywords :
Merger negotiations , takeover premium , stock options
Journal title :
Journal of Financial Economics
Serial Year :
2011
Journal title :
Journal of Financial Economics
Record number :
2212095
Link To Document :
بازگشت