• Title of article

    Optimal clearing arrangements for financial trades

  • Author/Authors

    Koeppl، نويسنده , , Thorsten and Monnet، نويسنده , , Cyril and Temzelides، نويسنده , , Ted، نويسنده ,

  • Issue Information
    روزنامه با شماره پیاپی سال 2012
  • Pages
    15
  • From page
    189
  • To page
    203
  • Abstract
    Clearinghouses support financial trades by keeping records of transactions and by providing liquidity through short-term credit that participants clear periodically. We study efficient clearing arrangements for exchanges, where traders must clear with a clearinghouse, and for over-the-counter (OTC) markets, where traders can clear bilaterally. When clearing is costly, it can be efficient to subsidize OTC clearing by charging a higher clearing price for transactions conducted on exchanges. The clearinghouse then operates across both markets. Since clearinghouses offer credit, intertemporal incentives are needed to ensure settlement. When liquidity costs increase, concerns about default lead to a tightening of liquidity provision.
  • Keywords
    OTC vs. exchanges , Private information , Liquidity costs , Default , Clearing
  • Journal title
    Journal of Financial Economics
  • Serial Year
    2012
  • Journal title
    Journal of Financial Economics
  • Record number

    2212285