Title of article
Legislating stock prices
Author/Authors
Cohen، نويسنده , , Lauren and Diether، نويسنده , , Karl and Malloy، نويسنده , , Christopher، نويسنده ,
Issue Information
روزنامه با شماره پیاپی سال 2013
Pages
22
From page
574
To page
595
Abstract
We demonstrate that legislation has a simple, yet previously undetected, impact on stock prices. Exploiting the voting record of legislators whose constituents are the affected industries, we show that the votes of these “interested” legislators capture important information seemingly ignored by the market. A long-short portfolio based on these legislatorsʹ views earns abnormal returns of over 90 basis points per month following the passage of legislation. Industries that we classify as beneficiaries of legislation experience significantly more positive earnings surprises and positive analyst revisions in the months following passage of the bill, as well as significantly higher future sales and profitability. We show that the more complex the legislation, the more difficulty the market has in assessing the impact of these bills. Further, the more concentrated the legislatorʹs interest in the industry, the more informative are her votes for future returns.
Keywords
Lobbying , Legislator incentives , Voting , Return predictability
Journal title
Journal of Financial Economics
Serial Year
2013
Journal title
Journal of Financial Economics
Record number
2212740
Link To Document