Title of article
Fund Manager Allocation
Author/Authors
Fang، نويسنده , , Jieyan and Kempf، نويسنده , , Alexander and Trapp، نويسنده , , Monika، نويسنده ,
Issue Information
روزنامه با شماره پیاپی سال 2014
Pages
14
From page
661
To page
674
Abstract
We show that fund families allocate their most skilled managers to market segments in which manager skill is rewarded best. In efficient markets, even skilled managers cannot generate excess returns. In less efficient markets, skilled managers can exploit inefficiencies and generate higher performance than unskilled managers. Fund families seem to be aware of the relation between skill, efficiency, and performance, and allocate more skilled managers to inefficient markets. They pursue this strategy when hiring new fund managers and when reassigning managers to funds within the family. Overall, we conclude that fund families allocate fund managers in an efficient way.
Keywords
Manager allocation , Performance , Skill , Market efficiency
Journal title
Journal of Financial Economics
Serial Year
2014
Journal title
Journal of Financial Economics
Record number
2212810
Link To Document