مرکز منطقه ای اطلاع رساني علوم و فناوري - Asymmetric benchmarking in compensation: Executives are rewarded for good luck but not penalized for bad

Title of article :

Asymmetric benchmarking in compensation: Executives are rewarded for good luck but not penalized for bad

Author/Authors :

Gerald T. Garvey، نويسنده , , Todd T. Milbourn، نويسنده ,

Issue Information :

روزنامه با شماره پیاپی سال 2006

Pages :

From page :

197

To page :

225

Keywords :

benchmarking , Pay for luck , CEO compensation

Journal title :

Journal of Financial Economics

Serial Year :

2006

Journal title :

Journal of Financial Economics

Record number :

257869

Link To Document :