The Effects of the Restriction on Statement of Preference in College Admission System

This paper analyzes the global diversification and stability of export sales by using Turkish data for The college admission system of Turkey is an example of twofold matching models. In this system, the candidates can choose up to twenty four programs when they declare their preferences over the programs. The matching formed under the restriction on statement of preference is not fair. The aim of this paper is to determine the scale of effect due to restriction on statement of preference by estimating the number of candidates who are justifiably envious in the unfair matching that formed under the restriction on statement of preferences. We used the data of college admission system of year 2005 in this paper. 22.6 percent of the candidates who had stated preferences, made choices for all. This ratio shows that the restriction on statement of preference is quite significant. We predicted the preferences that candidates declare when there is no restriction on stating preference by two different models, and placed them to the programs by the matching algorithm that we had developed. Results of those models show that presence of restriction on statement of preference causes to the placement of candidates to programs with an unfair matching, and unjustified envy on at least 2% of the candidates.