Other language title :
رفاه گمشده تحت قدرت بازاري و ناكارايي زيست محيطي در شرايط رقابت ناقص؛ مطالعه موردي صنايع انرژي بر ايران
Title of article :
Deadweight Loss under Market Power and Environmental Inefficiency in an Imperfect Competition: Iran’s Energy-Intensive Industries Case
Author/Authors :
Nabi Shahiki Tash, Mohammad Department of Economics - University of Sistan and Baluchestan - Sistan and Baluchestan, Iran , Khajehhasani, Mostafa Department of Economics - University of Sistan and Baluchestan - Sistan and Baluchestan, Iran , Yaqubi, Morteza Department of Agricultural Economics - Agricultural Faculty - Saffron Institute - University of Torbat Heydarieh - Razavi Khorasan, Iran
Abstract :
Monopoly and negative externalities are two aspects of market failure that affect the market performance. This study extends the Leibenstein approach, a framework to measure the market performance, which evaluates the social welfare costs of market power and environmental inefficiency. To assess the deadweight loss, we capture pollution impacts, on the market performance in an imperfect competition. In doing so, we assess marginal costs and price elasticity of demand by a Translog function, market power by Herfindahl-Hirschman and Lerner indices, and environmental inefficiency by directional distance functions, at a Cournot competition for Iran’s energy-intensive industries at the four-digit ISIC level. Our results demonstrate that the social welfare costs of welfare triangle and economic rent are negligible and include a small amount of welfare costs. Non-ferrous foundry imposes the lowest social cost (1.03% of its production value), and cement, lime and gypsum industries impose the highest social cost (50.7% of their production value). Those industries with more market power pay less attention to the environment. In polluting industries, welfare loss, due to market power, is relatively negligible. However, relatively high cost of social welfare, due to environmental inefficiency, indicates the necessity of levying a green tax to reduce the adverse effects.
Farsi abstract :
انحصار و اثرات جانبي منفي دو جنبه شكست بازار هستند كه بر عملكرد بازار تأثير ميگذارند. اين مطالعه براي سنجش عملكرد بازار و هزينه هاي رفاه اجتماعي در شرايط انحصار و ناكارآمدي زيست محيطي از رويكرد تعميم يافته لايبنشتاين استفاده ميكند. در اين راستا هزينه نهايي و كشش قيمت تقاضا با استفاده از يك تابع ترانسلوگ، قدرت بازاري با استفاده از شاخصهاي هرفيندال-هيرشمن و لرنر، و ناكارايي زيست محيطي با استفاده از توابع فاصله جهتدار براي صنايع انرژيبر ايران محاسبه ميشوند. نتايج نشان ميدهد كه هزينه هاي مثلث رفاه و رانت اقتصادي بسيار ناچيز است و درصد كمي از رفاه گمشده را دربرميگيرد. ريخته گري غير آهني كمترين هزينه اجتماعي 1.03 ٪ از ارزش توليد آن و صنايع سيمان، آهك و گچ بيشترين هزينه اجتماعي 50.7 ٪ از ارزش توليد آنها را تحميل ميكنند. صنايعي كه قدرت بازار بيشتري دارند كمتر به محيط زيست توجه ميكنند. در صنايع آلاينده، از دست دادن رفاه به دليل قدرت بازار نسبتاً ناچيز است. با اين حال، هزينه نسبتاً بالاي رفاه اجتماعي ناشي از عدم كارايي زيست محيطي، ضرورت اخذ ماليات سبز براي كاهش اثرات سو را نشان مي دهد.
Keywords :
Social Welfare Costs , Environmental Pollution , Market Performance , Energy-Intensive Industries , Monopoly
Journal title :
Iranian Journal of Economic Studies