Title of article
The Rann of Kutch and its Aftermath
Author/Authors
Ali, Lubna Abid Quaid-e-Azam University - Department of International Relations, Pakistan
From page
250
To page
256
Abstract
The brief armed encounter between small contingents of Indian and Pakistani armies in April 1965 resulted in what was generally perceived to be a victory for the latter. It was as a kind of an easy victory, which had earlier surprised the Chinese in the NEFA war in 1962. The overall lack of Indian preparedness for an armed defence of the disputed areas on both occasions convinced the Pakistani ruling elite that the fear of Indian military might was based on an exaggerated view. The incident of Rann of Kutch was therefore, one of the major determining factors in the eventual choice of Pakistani government to go for a military solution to Kashmir issue. This study is an attempt to explore some of the questions related to the issue of Rann of Kutch, like what was the historical origin of the conflict and where did it lead India and Pakistan in legal and political terms after independence? What led to the armed clash between two countries and what was its outcome? What perceptions did the two countries develop in the aftermath about their respective military capabilities? How did Rann of Kutch episode influence the strategic thinking of both countries on the eve of September 1965 war? The crux is that if there was no Rann of Kutch, the war if at all had taken place – would have taken a different course.
Keywords
Indo , Pakistan strategic thinking , Impossibility of military solution, Kashmir dispute, Territory
Journal title
South Asian Studies: A Research Journal of South Asian Studies
Journal title
South Asian Studies: A Research Journal of South Asian Studies
Record number
2689902
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