Title of article :
Inference of Mulla Sadra s Ethical Views in the Four Realms of Meta-Ethics
Author/Authors :
Seif-Farshad ، Mehran Department of Basic Sciences - Faculty of Paramedicine - Tabriz University of Medical Sciences , Kheire ، Yousef Department of Islamic Education - Center for the Development of Interdisciplinary Research in Islamic Sciences `and Health Sciences - Tabriz University of Medical Sciences , Madayen ، Mohammad Amin Center for the Development of Interdisciplinary Research in Islamic Sciences and Health Sciences - Tabriz University of Medical Sciences
From page :
109
To page :
119
Abstract :
Meta-ethics is an important and fundamental part of ethical philosophy. Normative ethics discusses the ethical criterion and definition of happiness and obligation; but Meta-ethics deals with its background. In other words, it puts ethical propositions into philosophical questions in terms of meaning, cognition, and truth. In the intellectual system of transcendent wisdom, metaphysical issues and sheer philosophy are studied in order to help human beings to develop and transcend. In fact, human ethics and transcendence along with theology are two main goals of transcendent wisdom. In this regard, it is important to understand Mulla Sadra s views on meta-ethics as well as to discover and deduce it among Mulla Sadra s philosophical views. While defining meta-ethics, explaining its domains and asking main questions about each of these domains, the method of comparative study is used in this paper in order to provide the most appropriate and consistent possible answers to questions in the realm of meta-ethics - based on Mulla Sadra s views on the originality of existence Substantial motion and Union of Intelligent and Intelligible and so on.
Keywords :
Ethics , Meta , Ethics , Transcendent Wisdom , Mulla Sadra
Journal title :
International Journal of Multicultural and Multireligious Understanding
Journal title :
International Journal of Multicultural and Multireligious Understanding
Record number :
2741626
Link To Document :
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