Title of article
ome evidence on strategic quantity reduction in multiple unit auctions
Author/Authors
Tenorio، نويسنده , , Rafael ، نويسنده ,
Issue Information
روزنامه با شماره پیاپی سال 1997
Pages
5
From page
209
To page
213
Abstract
Theoretical models of multi-unit auctions predict that bidders have a stronger incentive to reduce demand in uniform-price auctions than in discriminatory auctions. I find support for this prediction using data from foreign currency auctions in Zambia during the mid 1980ʹs. © 1997 Elsevier Science S.A.
Keywords
multi-unit auctions , Quantity strategies , Foreign exchange auctions
Journal title
Economics Letters
Serial Year
1997
Journal title
Economics Letters
Record number
434321
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