Title of article
Noisy equilibrium selection in coordination games
Author/Authors
Hans Carlsson، نويسنده , , Mattias Ganslandt، نويسنده ,
Issue Information
روزنامه با شماره پیاپی سال 1998
Pages
12
From page
23
To page
34
Abstract
By perturbing symmetric coordination games à la Bryant [Bryant, J., 1983. Quarterly Journal of Economics 98, 525–528] we derive unique solutions, the noise-proof equilibria. Our results agree with the experimental findings in Van Huyck et al. [Van Huyck, J.B., R.C. Battalio and R.O. Beil, 1990. American Economic Review 80, 234–248] and have an interesting connection with the notion of potential. We also briefly discuss median games
Keywords
Equilihrium selection: Courdinatioll: Stratqpc uncertalllty: Noise proofncss , P()tenllal
Journal title
Economics Letters
Serial Year
1998
Journal title
Economics Letters
Record number
434583
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