• Title of article

    Learning to play second-price auctions, an experimental study

  • Author/Authors

    Jorge G. Aseff، نويسنده ,

  • Issue Information
    روزنامه با شماره پیاپی سال 2004
  • Pages
    8
  • From page
    279
  • To page
    286
  • Abstract
    Existing experimental results in second-price auctions show that subjects bid consistently above their valuations. Experience, gained repeating a second-price auction, does not improve subjectʹs bidding behavior. When subjects ‘introspect,’ bidding behavior improves. Overbidding and underbidding fall significantly.
  • Keywords
    Second-price auctions , Overbidding , Underbidding
  • Journal title
    Economics Letters
  • Serial Year
    2004
  • Journal title
    Economics Letters
  • Record number

    435546