Title of article :
Justice sensitivity and distributive decisions in experimental games
Author/Authors :
Detlef Fetchenhauer، نويسنده , , Xu Huang، نويسنده ,
Issue Information :
روزنامه با شماره پیاپی سال 2004
Pages :
15
From page :
1015
To page :
1029
Abstract :
The concept of “justice sensitivity” has been introduced as a personality disposition by Schmitt, Neumann and Montada (1995) and is supposed to explain inter-individual differences in reactions to unfair situations. Justice sensitivity can be differentiated in three subdimensions: (1) Sensitivity with regard to experiencing injustice towards oneself (JSVictim), (2) sensitivity to observing that others are treated unfairly (JSObserver) and, (3) sensitivity to profiting from unfair events (JSPerpetrator). Using a sample of 190 university students the three dimensions of justice sensitivity were used to predict decisions in a number of game theoretical paradigms (dictator games, ultimatum games and a combination of these two games). The higher respondents scored on both JSObserver and JSPerpetrator, the more their decisions followed norms of equality. The contrary was true for JSVictim. The implications of these findings for future research using the concept of justice sensitivity are discussed.
Keywords :
Justice sensitivity , Ultimatum games , Dictator games , fairness
Journal title :
Personality and Individual Differences
Serial Year :
2004
Journal title :
Personality and Individual Differences
Record number :
457330
Link To Document :
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