A search for conceptual congruence between individuals and species

A new argument that species are individuals has recently been presented based on the way species names are used and systemic logic. The alternate idea that species are a categorical item, i.e., collections of individuals, was rejected. We wanted to evaluate this approach by establishing concepts that apply to individuals in order to examine if they are also applicable to a species viewed as a categorical item. It is our thinking that if species are not such, then concepts applicable to individuals will not be applicable to species so viewed. Individuals and species are similar in the presence of conceptual boundaries, unidirectional change and the presence of past and future time. These are all central, and salient, biological phenomena. But, these are concepts that apply also to populations which, for the most part, are not the same as species. Thus, these considerations infer that species, when viewed as a collection of individuals, do not share relevant concepts with individuals. Our conclusion is that a species is a `unityʹ rather than an `individualʹ.