Bioterrorism Drill in Illinois: A Systemwide Evaluation

Bioterrorism Drill in Illinois: A Systemwide Evaluation Page E27 C. J. Cutler*, T. Chou Close Close preview | Purchase PDF (63 K) | Related articles | Related reference work articles AbstractAbstract Abstract BACKGROUND: In May 2003, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security conducted a bioterrorism drill. It was the first drill since September 11, 2001. Sixty-four hospitals in Illinois participated in this bioterrorism drill. METHODS: The infection control experiences of eight acute-care hospitals in one healthcare system in the Chicago area were collated from a questionnaire sent to the infection control professionals. RESULTS: The healthcare system consists of three community teaching hospitals and five community hospitals with an average daily census ranging from 79 to 586. The hospitals report to two independent federal health jurisdictions (Chicago Department of Public Health and the Illinois Department of Public Health) and three county health departments. The surge of patients seriously challenged the capacities of the hospitals. More than 300 patients (human and paper) were sent to the eight Emergency Departments during the drill. Approximately one-third of the patients had symptoms consistent with pneumonic plague. A number of patients were dead on arrival or expired soon after. All hospitals initiated appropriate isolation precautions. Symptomatic patients were placed on airborne precautions in negative-pressure rooms, and personnel wore N95 particulate respirators. Most hospitals switched to surgical masks once the health departments identified the agent. One site recorded an inadequate supply of personal protective equipment. Infection Control or Employee Health gave prophylaxis to exposed patients and personnel. Communication was a serious problem. The drill was primarily confined to the Emergency Departments, and communication with other departments, including Infection Control, was poor or nonexistent at most sites. Health departments and other outside agencies provided confusing and sometimes contradictory information. CONCLUSIONS: The major lesson learned was that there was inadequate communication to and from the health departments and within the hospitals. Confusion existed, despite advance knowledge of the biological agent. The drill interfered with actual patient care; however the experience was beneficial in preparing hospitals for a real bioterrorism event.