Abstract :
According to the famous argument of Max Weber, there is a strong and direct
connection between the rule of law and economic success: the establishment of
the rule of law facilitates the functioning of an efficient economy. Indeed, as Weber
argued, the emergence and establishment of a rational legal order and formation
of law-based political authority were important factors which explain rapid
economic growth. These theses of Max Weber reflect long lasting and deeply embedded
European legal cultures and legal mentalities. Recent developments in
Eastern and Central Europe, especially privatization of state-owned property,
challenge a simplistic understanding of the Weberian argument. The sheer amount
of property to be privatized, and the strong interests involved make the rule of law
toothless, especially if the state is weak. Moreover, the very principle of the rule of
law becomes questionable if the law represents dominating interests in the context
of political capitalism. Thus, instead of the law-controlled privatization of national
property, one observes growing corruption, nepotism and clientelism as important
mechanisms of law-making. Additionally, the weakness of government, above all
the weakness of the law-applying and law enforcing agencies, and the traditional,
formalistic understanding of the rule of law principle, additionally contribute to
pathologies of economic transformation in Eastern and Central Europe, after the
fall of the Berlin Wall.
