Abstract :
This article re-examines the concept of the fiscal-military state in the context of the British
armed forces during the Seven Years War (1756–63). This war, characteristic of British warfare during the
eighteenth century, demonstrates that British victory depended on the state caring about the wellbeing of its
troops, as well as being perceived to care. At the practical level, disease among troops led to manpower
shortages and hence likely defeat, especially during sieges and colonial campaigns. During the 1762–3
Portuguese campaign, disease was regarded as a sign of ill-discipline, and jeopardized military and political
alliances. At Havana in 1762, the fear, reports, and actual outbreaks of disease threatened American colonial
support and recruitment for British campaigns. Throughout the controversial campaigns in the German
states, disease was interpreted as a symptom of bad governance, and used in partisan criticisms concerning
the conduct of the war. Military victory was not only about strategy, command, and technology, but nor was
it solely a question of money. Manpower could not simply be bought, but needed to be nurtured in the long
term through a demonstration that the British state cared about the welfare of its armies.
