Abstract :
During the Second World War, controversy surrounded not the inevitability of psychiatric
casualties but the extent to which they could be minimized by selection, training, morale, and leadership.
By early 1944, when planning for the D-Day landings was advanced, the problem of the psychiatric battle
casualty was considered manageable by careful preparation and clinical understanding. The campaign to
liberate Europe offered the newly formed Directorate of Army Psychiatry an opportunity to demonstrate its
effectiveness. Psychiatric services were deployed to Normandy to maximize the return of front-line troops to
duty. Commanders, however, entertained doubts about the value of military psychiatrists. By offering a
sanctioned escape route from battle, some believed that their mere presence undermined the fighting spirit of
combat troops. The records of 32 General (Psychiatric) Hospital have been analysed to discover categories of
troops most vulnerable to breakdown and to assess the impact of front-line treatments. Infantry soldiers, those
most likely to be killed, were disproportionately represented amongst admissions. Senior non-commissioned
officers were also at elevated risk of breakdown, some being war weary from earlier campaigns. Probably 36
per cent of admissions returned to combatant duty, and 53 per cent were evacuated to the UK. The scale of
psychiatric casualties revealed failures in pre-deployment screening.
