Abstract :
Although a substantial philosophical literature exists on the concept of ‘friendship’ and its connections
to politics, the possibility that groups such as states could be friends has largely been ignored. This is
puzzling since the description of political communities as friends is one that goes back to Thucydides.
Moreover, contemporary international politics is replete with references to the concepts of ‘friend’ and
‘friendship’. This article argues that international friendships provide powerful reasons for minimally
just states to engage in other-regarding conduct. Drawing on an Aristotelian account of self-interest for
inspiration, it is suggested that the same reasons that justify a state’s self-regard also justify its regard for
other states. These reasons rest on whether the basic institutions of a state – one’s own or another’s – are
minimally just. States, solely because of their character, have reason to enter into different levels of
friendship. Those different relationships in turn generate different expectations regarding consultation,
security and respect for autonomy.
