Why Frege would not be a neo-Fregean

In this paper, I seek to clarify an aspect of Fregeʹs thought that has been only insufficiently explained in the literature, namely, his notion of logical objects. I adduce some elements of Fregeʹs philosophy that elucidate why he saw extensions as natural candidates for paradigmatic cases of logical objects. Moreover, I argue (against the suggestion of some contemporary scholars, in particular, Wright and Boolos) that Frege could not have taken Humeʹs Principle instead of Axiom V as a fundamental law of arithmetic. This would be inconsistent with his views on logical objects. Finally, I shall argue that there is a connection between Fregeʹs view on this topic and the famous thesis first formulated in ʹUber Begriff und Gegenstandʹ that ʹthe concept horse is not a conceptʹ. As far as I know, no due attention has been given to this connection in the scholarly literature so far.