Abstract :
The American policy of nuclear arms reduction and stressing conventional
weapons, including its missile defense system and its role in nuclear
deterrence, pose numerous questions on the aims and consequences of the
deployment of such a system. Among these questions are whether this
system is able to realize nuclear deterrence and what the impact of its
deployment would be on security-military behaviors of other states and
specifically that of the Islamic Republic of Iran. On the same basis, the main
question of this essay is if the missile defense system canestablish nuclear
deterrence? The hypothesis put to the test is that the missile defense system
cannot play a considerable part in the creation of nuclear deterrence by
itself, and that as far as the consequences are concerned, it could fuel an
arms race and deteriorate security and stability. The section on
consequences argues how the missile system instigates foes and main rivals,
provokes peripheral circles of enemies and main competitors, and promotes
perceptions of U.S. strategy as offensive rather than defensive. As the
confronting of a possible offensive by Iran is declared as one of the aims of
the U.S.missile defense shield in Europe, the subsidiary question deals with
the potential effect the deployment of the missile defense systemcould have
on the security-military behavior of Iran. This paper asserts that the
deployment of the system extends perceived insecurity on the part of Iran
and pushes the Islamic Republic towards adopting a “reciprocal defensive strategy” or “reciprocal offensive strategy”.
