Plantinga’s version of the free-will argument: the good and evil that free beings do

According to Plantinga’s version of the free-will argument (FWA), theexistence of free beings in the world who, on the whole, do more good than evil isthe greater moral good that cannot be secured by even an omnipotent God withoutallowing some evil and thereby shows the logical compatibility of God with evil.In this essay, I argue that there are good empirical and moral reasons, from thestandpoint of one plausible conception of Christian ethics, to doubt that Plantinga’sversion of the FWA succeeds as a theodicy. In particular, I argue that, given thisunderstanding of Christian ethics, it seems reasonable to think it false that freebeings are doing more good than evil in the world. While there are surely possibleworlds in which free beings do more good than evil, this material world seemsclearly not one of those. Thus, while Plantinga’s version might succeed as a defenceagainst the logical problem of evil, it will neither rebut the evidential problem of evilnor, without more, ground a successful theodicy that reconciles God’s existence withthe evil that occurs in this world