• Title of article

    Newman’s Objection

  • Author/Authors

    Peter M. Ainsworth، نويسنده ,

  • Issue Information
    روزنامه با شماره پیاپی سال 2009
  • Pages
    37
  • From page
    135
  • To page
    171
  • Abstract
    This paper is a review of work on Newman’s objection to epistemic structural realism (ESR). In Section 2, a brief statement of ESR is provided. In Section 3, Newman’s objection and its recent variants are outlined. In Section 4, two responses that argue that the objection can be evaded by abandoning the Ramsey-sentence approach to ESR are considered. In Section 5, three responses that have been put forward specifically to rescue the Ramsey-sentence approach to ESR from the modern versions of the objection are discussed. Finally, in Section 6, three responses are considered that are neutral with respect to one’s approach to ESR and all argue (in different ways) that the objection can be evaded by introducing the notion that some relations/structures are privileged over others. It is concluded that none of these suggestions is an adequate response to Newman’s objection, which therefore remains a serious problem for ESRists.
  • Journal title
    The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science
  • Serial Year
    2009
  • Journal title
    The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science
  • Record number

    708503