Title of article
Newman’s Objection
Author/Authors
Peter M. Ainsworth، نويسنده ,
Issue Information
روزنامه با شماره پیاپی سال 2009
Pages
37
From page
135
To page
171
Abstract
This paper is a review of work on Newman’s objection to epistemic structural realism
(ESR). In Section 2, a brief statement of ESR is provided. In Section 3, Newman’s
objection and its recent variants are outlined. In Section 4, two responses that argue
that the objection can be evaded by abandoning the Ramsey-sentence approach to ESR
are considered. In Section 5, three responses that have been put forward specifically to
rescue the Ramsey-sentence approach to ESR from the modern versions of the objection
are discussed. Finally, in Section 6, three responses are considered that are neutral with
respect to one’s approach to ESR and all argue (in different ways) that the objection
can be evaded by introducing the notion that some relations/structures are privileged
over others. It is concluded that none of these suggestions is an adequate response to
Newman’s objection, which therefore remains a serious problem for ESRists.
Journal title
The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science
Serial Year
2009
Journal title
The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science
Record number
708503
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