Title of article :
Newman’s Objection
Author/Authors :
Peter M. Ainsworth، نويسنده ,
Issue Information :
روزنامه با شماره پیاپی سال 2009
Pages :
37
From page :
135
To page :
171
Abstract :
This paper is a review of work on Newman’s objection to epistemic structural realism (ESR). In Section 2, a brief statement of ESR is provided. In Section 3, Newman’s objection and its recent variants are outlined. In Section 4, two responses that argue that the objection can be evaded by abandoning the Ramsey-sentence approach to ESR are considered. In Section 5, three responses that have been put forward specifically to rescue the Ramsey-sentence approach to ESR from the modern versions of the objection are discussed. Finally, in Section 6, three responses are considered that are neutral with respect to one’s approach to ESR and all argue (in different ways) that the objection can be evaded by introducing the notion that some relations/structures are privileged over others. It is concluded that none of these suggestions is an adequate response to Newman’s objection, which therefore remains a serious problem for ESRists.
Journal title :
The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science
Serial Year :
2009
Journal title :
The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science
Record number :
708503
Link To Document :
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