Title of article :
Risk and concentration in payment and securities settlement systems
Author/Authors :
David C. Mills Jr.، نويسنده , , Travis D. Nesmith، نويسنده ,
Issue Information :
روزنامه با شماره پیاپی سال 2008
Abstract :
What drives the intraday patterns of settlement in payment and securities settlement systems? Using a model of the strategic interaction of participants in these systems to capture some stylized facts about the Federal Reserveʹs Fedwire funds and securities systems, this paper identifies three factors that influence a participantʹs decision on when to send transactions intraday: cost of intraday liquidity, extent of settlement risk, and system design. With these factors, the model can make predictions regarding the impact of policy on the concentration of transactions, amount of intraday overdrafts, central bank credit exposure, costs to system participants, and other risks.
Keywords :
Interbank payments , Securities settlement , Bank behavior , Strategic games
Journal title :
Journal monetary economics
Journal title :
Journal monetary economics