Abstract :
Arms transfers beyond the state-to-state realm can have harmful effects
for international security dramatically affecting the relations and behavior
of states. This article examines why an emerging international norm
on ‘‘prohibiting states to transfer arms to nonstate groups’’ has failed
to diffuse at the international level. It discusses the already available
international law framework existing at the regional and international
levels upon which the potential norm could be built. The failure of the
norm to diffuse at the international level can be primarily explained by
the existence of a long-consolidated norm: the customary practice of
states to transfer weapons to nonstate actors, that is, groups they deem
legitimate to, without any interference or constraint.1 The unrestrained
transfer of weapons is an established foreign-policy practice. It is the
way states form, uphold alliances, extend friendships, and build spheres
of influence (Sorokin 1994). Clearly, no state willingly wants to give this
up. Therefore, the multilateral agreement on a norm barring most or
all transfers of weapons to nonstate actors would curtail the freedom of
action to build spheres of influence as states please. There are genuine
ethical and moral dilemmas in this discussion, a nonstate actor may be
a freedom fighter or a terrorist depending on different perspectives.
The distinction between the categories ‘‘state’’ and ‘‘nonstate’’ actors
may risk classifying actors in two camps: the good and the bad, respectively.
This is problematic as a few states are known to be the most brutal
perpetrators of egregious violations against their own citizens,
whereas certain nonstate actors are legitimately fighting for the protection
of vulnerable populations
