Title of article :
IMF programs:Who is chosen and what
are the effects?$
Author/Authors :
Robert J. Barro، نويسنده ,
Issue Information :
روزنامه با شماره پیاپی سال 2005
Abstract :
IMF loans react to economic conditions but are also sensitive to political-economy variables.
Loans tend to be larger and more frequent when a country has a bigger quota and more professional
staff at the IMF and when a country is more connected politically and economically to the United
States and major European countries. These results are of considerable interest for their own sake.
More importantly for present purposes, the results provide instrumental variables for estimating the
effects of IMF loan programs on economic growth and other variables. This instrumental estimation
allows us to sort out the economic effects of the loan programs from the responses of IMF lending to
economic conditions. The estimates show that a higher IMF loan-participation rate reduces
economic growth. IMF lending does not have significant effects on investment, inflation, government
consumption, and international openness. However, IMF loan participation has small negative
effects on democracy and the rule of law. The reduction in the rule of law implies an additional,
indirect channel whereby IMF lending reduces economic growth.
r 2005 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
Keywords :
Economic growth , instruments , Political economy , IMF lending
Journal title :
Journal of Monetary Economics
Journal title :
Journal of Monetary Economics