Title of article :
Risk and concentration in payment and securities
settlement systems
Author/Authors :
David C. Mills Jr.، نويسنده , , Travis D. Nesmith، نويسنده ,
Issue Information :
روزنامه با شماره پیاپی سال 2008
Abstract :
What drives the intraday patterns of settlement in payment and securities settlement systems? Using a model of the
strategic interaction of participants in these systems to capture some stylized facts about the Federal Reserve’s Fedwire
funds and securities systems, this paper identifies three factors that influence a participant’s decision on when to send
transactions intraday: cost of intraday liquidity, extent of settlement risk, and system design. With these factors, the model
can make predictions regarding the impact of policy on the concentration of transactions, amount of intraday overdrafts,
central bank credit exposure, costs to system participants, and other risks.
Published by Elsevier B.V.
Keywords :
Strategic games , Bank behavior , Interbank payments , Securities settlement
Journal title :
Journal of Monetary Economics
Journal title :
Journal of Monetary Economics