Title of article :
U.S.taxpolicyandhealthinsurancedemand:Canaregressivepolicy improvewelfare
Author/Authors :
KarstenJeske، نويسنده ,
Issue Information :
روزنامه با شماره پیاپی سال 2008
Pages :
12
From page :
210
To page :
221
Abstract :
The U.S.taxpolicyonhealthinsuranceisregressivebecauseitsubsidizesonlythose offeredgroupinsurancethroughtheiremployers,whoalsotendtohavearelativelyhigh income.Moreover,thesubsidytakestheformofdeductionsfromtheprogressive incometaxsystemgivinghighincomeearnersalargersubsidy.Tounderstand theeffectofthepolicy,weconstructadynamicgeneralequilibriummodelwith heterogenousagentsandanendogenousdemandforhealthinsurance.Acomplete removalofthesubsidymayleadtoapartialcollapseofthegroupinsurancemarket, reduce theinsurancecoverageanddeterioratewelfare.Thereis,however,roomfor improvingthecoverageandwelfarebyextendingarefundablecredittotheindividual insurancemarket
Keywords :
Health insuranceRisk-sharingTaxpolicy
Journal title :
Journal of Monetary Economics
Serial Year :
2008
Journal title :
Journal of Monetary Economics
Record number :
846286
Link To Document :
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