Title of article :
A modelofasystemicbankrun
Author/Authors :
Harald Uhlig، نويسنده ,
Issue Information :
روزنامه با شماره پیاپی سال 2010
Pages :
19
From page :
78
To page :
96
Abstract :
This paperprovidesamodeloftheviewthatthe2008financialcrisisisreminiscentofa bankrun,focussingonsixstylizedkeyfeatures.Inparticular,corefinancialinstitutions have investedtheirfundsinasset-backedsecuritiesratherthancommittedtolong-term projects:indistress,thesecanpotentiallybesoldtoalargepoolofoutsideinvestorsat steepdiscounts.Iconsidertwodifferentmotivesforoutsideinvestorsandtheir interactionwithbankstradingasset-backedsecurities:uncertaintyaversionversus adverseselection.Ishallarguethattheversionwithuncertaintyaverseinvestorsis moreconsistentwiththestylizedfactsthantheadverseselectionperspective:inthe former,thecrisisdeepens,thelargerthemarketshareofdistressedcorebanks,whilea runbecomeslesslikelyinsteadasaresultintheadverseselectionversion.Therefore, theoutrightpurchaseoftroubledassetsbythegovernmentatpricesabovecurrent marketpricesmaybothalleviatethefinancialcrisesaswellasprovidetaxpayerswith returnsabovethoseforsafesecurities.
Keywords :
Systemic bankrunBank runSystemic riskFinancial crisisFiresale pricingAdverse selectionUncertainty aversion
Journal title :
Journal of Monetary Economics
Serial Year :
2010
Journal title :
Journal of Monetary Economics
Record number :
846375
Link To Document :
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