Title of article
Bankingpanicsandpolicyresponses
Author/Authors
Huberto M.Ennis، نويسنده ,
Issue Information
روزنامه با شماره پیاپی سال 2010
Pages
16
From page
404
To page
419
Abstract
When policymakershavelimitedcommitmentpower,self-fulfillingbankrunscanarise
as anequilibriumphenomenon.Westudyhowsuchbankingpanicsunfoldinaversion
of the DiamondandDybvig(1983) model. Aruninthissettingisnecessarilypartial,
with onlysomedepositorsparticipating.Inaddition,arunnaturallyoccursinwaves,
with eachwaveofwithdrawalspromptingafurtherresponsefrompolicymakers.In
thisway,theinterplaybetweentheactionsofdepositorsandtheresponsesofpolicy
makersshapesthecourseofacrisis.
Keywords
Bank runsLimited commitmentTime consistencySuspension ofconvertibility
Journal title
Journal of Monetary Economics
Serial Year
2010
Journal title
Journal of Monetary Economics
Record number
846400
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