Title of article :
The signalingroleofpolicyactions
Author/Authors :
Romain Baeriswyl، نويسنده ,
Issue Information :
روزنامه با شماره پیاپی سال 2010
Pages :
14
From page :
682
To page :
695
Abstract :
In aneconomyaffectedbyshocksthatareimperfectlyknown,themonetaryinstrument takesonadualstabilizingrole:asapolicyresponsethatdirectlyinfluencesthe economyandasavehicleforinformationthatrevealsthecentralbank’sassessmentto firms.Becausemark-upshockscannotbeneutralizedbymonetarypolicy,providing firmswithmoreinformationabouttheseshocksexacerbatestheirreactionandcreates a largerdistortion.Recognizingthesignalingroleofitsinstrument,thecentralbank distortsitspolicyresponseinordertooptimallyshapefirms’beliefs.Whileproviding firmswithmoreinformationisalwaysdetrimentaltotheoutputgap,ithasamore subtleeffectonpricedispersiondependingonwhetherinformationisprovidedthrough thetransparencychannelorthroughthesignalingchannel.Althoughmoretranspar- ency isalwaysdetrimentaltowelfare,theinformationthatisconveyedbythemonetary instrumentimproveswelfarewhenfirms’coordinationishighlyvaluable
Journal title :
Journal of Monetary Economics
Serial Year :
2010
Journal title :
Journal of Monetary Economics
Record number :
846422
Link To Document :
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