Title of article :
The signalingroleofpolicyactions
Author/Authors :
Romain Baeriswyl، نويسنده ,
Issue Information :
روزنامه با شماره پیاپی سال 2010
Abstract :
In aneconomyaffectedbyshocksthatareimperfectlyknown,themonetaryinstrument
takesonadualstabilizingrole:asapolicyresponsethatdirectlyinfluencesthe
economyandasavehicleforinformationthatrevealsthecentralbank’sassessmentto
firms.Becausemark-upshockscannotbeneutralizedbymonetarypolicy,providing
firmswithmoreinformationabouttheseshocksexacerbatestheirreactionandcreates
a largerdistortion.Recognizingthesignalingroleofitsinstrument,thecentralbank
distortsitspolicyresponseinordertooptimallyshapefirms’beliefs.Whileproviding
firmswithmoreinformationisalwaysdetrimentaltotheoutputgap,ithasamore
subtleeffectonpricedispersiondependingonwhetherinformationisprovidedthrough
thetransparencychannelorthroughthesignalingchannel.Althoughmoretranspar-
ency isalwaysdetrimentaltowelfare,theinformationthatisconveyedbythemonetary
instrumentimproveswelfarewhenfirms’coordinationishighlyvaluable
Journal title :
Journal of Monetary Economics
Journal title :
Journal of Monetary Economics