Quantum social game theory

Most game-theoretic studies of strategic interaction assume independent individual strategies as the basic unit of analysis. This paper explores the effects of non-independence on strategic interaction. Two types of non-independence effects are considered. First, the paper considers subjective non-independence at the level of the individual actor by looking at how choice ambivalence shapes the decision-making process. Specifically, how do alternative individual choices superpose with one another to “constructively/destructively” shape each otherʹs role within an actorʹs decision-making process? This process is termed as quantum superposition of alternative choices. Second, the paper considers how inter-subjective non-independence across actors engenders collective strategies among two or more interacting actors. This is termed as quantum entanglement of strategies. Taking into account both types of non-independence effect makes possible the emergence of a new collective equilibrium, without assuming signaling, prior “contract” agreement or third-party moderation, or even “cheap talk”. I apply these ideas to analyze the equilibrium possibilities of a situation wherein N actors play a quantum social game of cooperation. I consider different configurations of large-N quantum entanglement using the approach of density operator. I specifically consider the following configurations: star-shaped, nearest-neighbors, and full entanglement.