Self-questioning games and ping-pong effect in the BA network

In this paper, we study the evolutionary Prisonerʹs Dilemma Game (PDG) and the Snowdrift Game (SG) with a self-questioning updating mechanism in the Barabási–Albert (BA) network. Although this self-questioning mechanism does not show much advantages in sustaining the cooperative behavior comparing to the existing models, it can produce interesting non-monotonic phenomena in numerical simulations. Furthermore, this new model has avoided the system from being enmeshed in a globally defective trap, which is a shortcoming of the existing models based on the learning mechanisms. It is found that in certain cases, the so called “Cooperative Ping-pong Effect” occurs in both the two games and plays an important role in the behaviors of the whole system. This new model shows non-trivial characters comparing to the previous work and is worthy of further studies.