Unilateral transfer of abatement capital

In a model of global carbon dioxide control, Yang (Yang, Z., 1999. Should the North make unilateral technology transfers to the south? North–South cooperation and conflicts in responses to global climate change. Resource and Energy Economics 21 (1), 67–87.) advocates the unilateral transfer of abatement capital from North to South. It is argued here that such transfers should be contingent on the Southʹs willingness to equiproportionally abate and sequester emissions according to an efficient version of Rose and Stevensʹ (Rose, A., Stevens, B., 1993. The efficiency and equity of marketable permits of CO2 emissions. Resource and Energy Economics 15, 117–146.) sovereignty criterion, a straightforward and popular, though not necessarily equitable, burden sharing rule for reducing greenhouse gases on a global scale. Under this program, the North would abate less and preserve a smaller quantity of forests than it would if there were equiproportional reductions in the absence of capital transfers.