On the effects of emission standards as a non-tariff barrier to trade in the case of a foreign Bertrand duopoly: A note

Employing a model of an environmentally differentiated product market, we analyze how an emission regulation as non-tariff barriers to trade affects imports, the environment, and welfare in the case of a foreign Bertrand duopoly. Related to this issue, we reconsider the result of Moraga-González and Padrón-Fumero [Moraga-González, J.L., Padrón-Fumero, N., 2002. Environmental policy in a green market. Environmental and Resource Economics 22, 419–447] that a strict emission standard on a dirtier product degrades the environment and reduces the net social surplus associated with the valuation of environmental damage, if the marginal social valuation of environmental damage is larger. On the other hand, we show that a strict emission standard on a cleaner product always improves the environment and the net social surplus associated with the valuation of environmental damage.