• Title of article

    Empirical observations of bidding patterns in Australiaʹs National Electricity Market

  • Author/Authors

    Xinmin Hu، نويسنده , , George Grozev، نويسنده , , David Batten، نويسنده ,

  • Issue Information
    دوهفته نامه با شماره پیاپی سال 2005
  • Pages
    12
  • From page
    2075
  • To page
    2086
  • Abstract
    For more than a decade, electricity industries have been undergoing reform worldwide. However, there are various, sometimes contradictory, conclusions about the performance of these restructured electricity markets. Market performance depends largely on how each market participant responds to the market design — including market rules, market operational procedures, and information revelation. In this paper, we identify and examine the strategies adopted by generators in Australiaʹs National Electricity Market, based on publicly available data for the period from May 1, 2002 to May 31, 2003. We try to understand and answer some basic questions like how generators respond collectively or individually to changes in market conditions (e.g. load changes) and why they behave in this way. The statistics calculated from the data show that wide variations in the frequency of strategic bidding and rebidding exist; that generators more frequently use capacity offers as a strategic tool than price offers; that large generating units are more likely to use capacity strategies to control market prices; and that generators are capable of responding to changes in market conditions.
  • Keywords
    Electricity markets , market power , Bidding strategies
  • Journal title
    Energy Policy
  • Serial Year
    2005
  • Journal title
    Energy Policy
  • Record number

    970598