A modified Cournot model of the natural gas market in the European Union: Mixed-motives delegation in a politicized environment

With Gazprom gaining prominence as the major supplier of natural gas in the European Union, the European gas market becomes more politicized. We assume that Gazpromʹs interest as a state monopolist is not only to maximize profit, but also to seek market power, presumably because this contributes to the geopolitical power of Russia at large. We introduce a modeling tool, so-called strategic delegation games, to analyze the implications of Gazpromʹs operation in the EU. By way of illustration, we model the case where Gazprom competes against two profit-maximizing rivals: Algerian Sonatrach and Norwegian Statoil. We prove that if Gazprom serves any of a comprehensive type of nonprofit objectives, the outcome is beneficial for the EUʹs consumers, as Gazpromʹs behavior shifts volumes up and brings prices down.