دفع النقض بمنع الوصف عند الاصوليين

Pushing the veto by forbidding the description of the fundamentalists

Countermand is one of the means of disproving a legal cause (qawadih al-‘illa) that most of the scholars of legal theory (al-usuliyyun) rely on. Someone whose proposed legal cause is contradicted by an opponent must work hard to remove the contradiction through a variety of means in order to preserve the soundness of his legal cause (and, by extension, the legal analogy that follows from it). The scholars of legal methodology have differed about the methods of responding to an opponent’s contradiction of one’s proposed legal cause. The first method is called “removing by an attribute” (al-daf’u bi al-wasf), in which one argues for the existence of the legal cause of the derived ruling in the location of the disputed contradiction. The goal of this thesis is to clarify this method of responding to a claim of contradiction, to describe how the scholars of legal theory treated it, to attempt to unite their different approaches, and to study some questions of legal theory that are related to it.