THE ECONOMIC FRAMEWORK FOR MONITORING AND HOLDING CORPORATE MANAGEMENT TO ACCOUNT

It is alleged that there are twelve main reasons which possibly affect investors’ willingness to hold corporate managers to account. These reasons are: thin equity; diversification; liquidity of shares; reliance on other investors; apathy of shareholders’ agents; keeping access to soft information; comparison with other investment managers’ performance and market indices; conflict of interests; short termism; corporate managers’ manipulation of the general meeting’s agenda; political retaliation; and, investing in index funds. By gauging institutional investors and investment managers’ opinions, this paper examines whether or not these alleged reasons are truly inherent in the economic framework of the UK market which necessarily affects at least some institutional investors and investment managers’ willingness to hold corporate managers to account. This paper gives a useful insight into respondents’ opinions about these twelve reasons, concluding that the economic framework of the market fails to support institutional investors and investment managers in holding corporate managers to account.