پديدآورندگان :
Abdolmaleki Behzad b.abdolmaleki.ir@ieee.org Information Systems and Security Lab (ISSL), Sharif University of Technology, Tehran, Iran , Baghery Karim k.baghery.1988@ieee.org Information Systems and Security Lab (ISSL), Sharif University of Technology, Tehran, Iran , Akhbari Bahareh akhbari@eetd.kntu.ac.ir EE Dept., K. N. Toosi University of Technology, Tehran, Iran , Alavi Seyed Mohammad malavi@ihu.ac.ir Imam Hossein Comprehensive University (IHCU), Tehran, Iran , Aref Mohammad Reza aref@sharif.edu ISSL Lab, EE Dept., Sharif University of Technology, Tehran, Iran
كليدواژه :
RFID , Key Exchange Protocol , Key Agreement Protocol , Security , privacy , EPC C1 G2 standard.
چكيده فارسي :
In the last decade, various types of RFID security schemes have been proposed which have tried to provide all security and privacy requirements of end-users. In this paper, we cryptanalyze two new-found key exchange and key agreement security schemes which are proposed by Zhang et al. and Kim in 2012 and 2013 respectively. We present the reveal secret parameter, tag impersonation and traceability attacks on Zhang et al.’s protocol with success probability “𝟏”, and also we show that an attacker can impersonate the tag and the reader of Kim’s protocol both with success probabilities “ 𝟏 𝟒 ”. We also present some modifications on the structure of studied schemes and propose two modified schemes which overcome all the discovered flaws. Finally, the improved protocols are compared with some similar protocols in terms of security and privacy.
