Modeling‎ competitive information diffusion in social networks as a Stackelberg game

In this paper, competitive ‎influence‎ ‎maximization‎ ‎problem‎ is ‎modeled‎ as‎ a Stackelberg game with complete information and rational players‎ ‎in‎ ‎which‎, ‎there‎ ‎are‎ ‎two‎ ‎players‎ ‎(social‎ ‎change‎ ‎agents)‎ ‎who‎‎ ‎tries‎‎‎ ‎to‎ ‎maximize‎ ‎the‎ ‎diffusion‎ ‎of‎ ‎their own information through a social network with heterogeneous nodes.‎ Players objective is to find the best initial seed nodes. We study an influence maximization model in which users heterogeneity‎, ‎information content‎, ‎and network structure are considered‎‎. ‎Then, the proposed Stackelberg game is implemented on a randomly selected network and all of the Sub Perfect Nash Equilibriums (SPNE) of the game will be determined‎.