Author/Authors :
Pelletier، نويسنده , , Nathan، نويسنده ,
DocumentNumber :
3541232
Title Of Article :
Environmental sustainability as the first principle of distributive justice: Towards an ecological communitarian normative foundation for ecological economics
شماره ركورد :
3200
Latin Abstract :
The ecological economic concern with environmental sustainability embodies the normative orientations of the field. This concern is foremost a matter of distributive justice, the definition of which determines the relevance of the appropriate scale and efficient allocation criteria. Yet it would appear that the discipline lacks a shared, internally consistent set of ethical premises by which this concern might be legitimized. Various authors have embraced a Rawlsian conception of liberal justice as the appropriate banner for ecological economics in place of the consequentialist–libertarian foundations of neoclassical economics (including environmental economics). It is argued here that this is insufficient in so far as it is premised on a vision of a discrete, self-sufficient economic actor. Instead, it is posited that an ecological economic ethic must proceed from an understanding of the economic actor as community member — a recognition implicit in recent ecological economic contributions focused on discourse ethics and deliberative democracy. An ecological communitarian conception of distributive justice, which views the well-being of the individual as inseparable from the integrity of its implicate, mutually constituting human and non-human natural communities, is advanced as the appropriate basis for the ecological economic world-view. In this light, the thermodynamic foundations of ecological economics are seen to provide the necessary departure point for normative decision-making oriented towards ensuring sustainability in economic organization.
From Page :
1887
NaturalLanguageKeyword :
Economics , communitarianism , Ecology , Distributive justice , Sustainability , ETHICS
JournalTitle :
Studia Iranica
To Page :
1894
To Page :
1894
Link To Document :
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